ABSTRACT. We propose strategic games wherein the strategies consist of players asking each other questions and answering those questions. We study simplifications of such games wherein two players simultaneously ask each other a question that the opponent is then obliged to answer. The motivation for our research is to model conversation including the dynamics of questions and answers, to provide new links between game theory and dynamic logics of information, and to exploit the dynamic/strategic structure that, we think, lies implicitly inside epistemic models for epistemic languages, and to make that structure an explicit subject of logical study. Our main contributions are: the notion of a two-person question-answer game with information goals, the existence and computation of equilibria for these games, the correspondence with Bayesian games and their equilibria, and a connection between logic and game theory namely the existence of equilibria for positive goal formulae.
Introduction
I am in the middle of Manhattan, somewhere halfway a long, long avenue, and I am lost. Some stranger, walking in the other direction, is coming nearer. I approach him, and ask him, pointing ahead of me: "Is this the way to the railway station?" I will now get one of three possible answers: "Yes,", "No,", and "I don't know." (We discount the possibility that I will be ignored and that the stranger will continue on his way, of which the game move equivalent would be "I prefer not to answer the question.") Each answer is informative. After the third answer I may ask the same question to someone else. Questions and answers can be analyzed in dynamic epistemic logic, and best questions and best answers in game theory. We focus on dynamic epistemic logic and not on game theory, and our main contribution is a novel link between the two. In this introduction we now first address the question, then the answer, and lastly the game wherein such questions and answers figure. The railway example misses that game aspect, but now consider having to decide between asking the conference chair "Are the outcomes of the submissions already known?" or "Is my submission accepted?" What the best question is to ask, also depends on the answers you may expect or fear.
Question
Suppose I am agent a, the stranger is agent b, and p is the atomic proposition that the railway station is ahead of me. The other direction, behind me, is therefore represented by ¬p. There are several pragmatic preconditions for the agent asking the question 'p?'. She should not know the truth about p, i.e., she does not know p, and she does not know ¬p. We are assuming a multi-agent epistemic logic to model questions, where the expression K a p stands for 'a knows p,' and where the epistemic modality K a is interpreted with an equivalence relation ∼ a . This pragmatic constraint therefore amounts to the precondition ¬K a p ∧ ¬K a ¬p. The agent asking the question also has expectations about the agent that will answer the question, and that constitutes another pragmatic precondition. She considers it possible that he knows the answer, i.e., ¬K a ¬(K b p ∨ K b ¬p). She also considers it likely that he knows the answer, i.e., she believes that tentatively, B a (K b p ∨ K b ¬p), where belief and knowledge are combined (Kraus et al., 1988) ; we may also see that as a combination of preferences and knowledge (van Benthem et al., 2007) . We will not further address the distinction between belief (whether defeasible or not) and knowledge in this paper.
A question ϕ? splits the domain in the set of states [[ϕ] ] where ϕ is true and the set of states [[¬ϕ] ] where ϕ is false, i.e., the question induces a dichotomy on the domain of the model. In the approach by van Benthem and Minica (van Benthem et al., 2009; Minicȃ, 2011) , a question or issue ϕ? is represented by the issue relation ≈ ϕ -the action of addressing an issue consists of the mentioned refinement into [[ϕ] ] states and [[¬ϕ] ] states. Such issue relations go back to (Groenendijk et al., 1997; Kelly, 1996; Groenendijk et al., 1982) .
Answer
As said, there are three possible answers: 'Yes', 'No', and 'I don't know'. (A fourth possible answer would be: 'I decline to answer the question'.) Such responses may be as uninformative as possible. For example, assume a deal of cards over players. If I were to ask you "Do you have card 0" and you answer me "Yes, I have 0, 1, and 2" then you give me more than I asked for. You could have answered "Yes," i.e., "Yes, I have 0." If your answer to the question ϕ? is 'yes', you confirm that you know that ϕ, and nothing more than that is required. This means that your answer corresponds to the (unique) largest union of equivalence classes representing your knowledge that is contained in the ϕ-states of the model. This is of course exactly the denotation of the formula K b ϕ. Your answer is therefore the public announcement K b ϕ! (Plaza, 1989) .
2 Similarly, if your answer is "No, I don't," this is an announcement of the formula K b ¬ϕ and its denotation is the complement of the (unique) smallest union of equivalence classes that contains the ϕ-states. If your answer is "I don't know" you get the remainder, i.e. the union of all ∼ a classes that properly intersect with ≈ ϕ . The 'don't know' answer is an announcement of the formula ¬K b ϕ ∧ ¬K b ¬ϕ-as the agents know about their ignorance, this also has the form of a known announcement, namely K b (¬K b ϕ ∧ ¬K b ¬ϕ), so indeed this must also be a union of b-equivalence classes.
This in fact shows that answers to questions can be seen as rough sets (Pawlak, 1992) . Given the set [[ϕ] ] (i.e., the subset of the domain consisting of the ϕ-states), in rough set terms known as the target, take the lower and upper ∼ b approximation of the target, i.e.,
. If the answer to the question is 'yes', the actual state is in the lower approximation. If the answer is 'no', the actual state is in the complement of the upper approximation. If the answer is 'don't know', the actual state is in the upper approximation minus the lower approximation. EXAMPLE 1. -The answer to a question ϕ? can be seen as a rough set. In the figure below, the (11 × 11 = 121) cells represent the equivalence classes of the agent answering the question. X corresponds to [[ϕ] ], the white region to the answer 'no' and the black region to the answer 'yes' (and this could have been the other way round), and grey region (necessarily) to 'don't know'.
In dynamic epistemic logic, a public announcement is interpreted as a model restriction. Therefore, answering the question can be seen as executing one of three possible such restrictions, a non-deterministic program so to speak. Alternatively (and equivalently!), we can see answering the question as a refinement of the equivalence classes for all agents (and not just of the agent asking the question) with the issue relation ≈ ϕ , i.e., for all agents a,
EXAMPLE 2. -Consider three cards 0, 1, 2 and four players a, b, c, d. Players a, b, c each draw one card, let us suppose they draw 0, 1, and 2 respectively. Player d is an onlooker, who does not draw a card. It is given that players know what the deck of cards is, and that each of the three who have drawn a card only knows his own card. We get a model with uncertainty about six different deals of cards. Now a announces that she does not have card 1, which results in elimination of alternatives 1 a 0 b 2 c and 1 a 2 b 0 c . And here we start. The uncertainty between card deals before and after the announcement can be modelled as follows. (If two deals cannot be distinguished by a player, they are linked by an edge labelled with that player. The relation is assumed to be transitive: no card deals at all can be distinguished by player d.) The next section gives formal details about such structures, for the case of two agents. If b has card 1, b does not learn a's card from her announcement that she does not have card 1. Otherwise, he does. answers 'I don't know', d concludes that the card deal must be one of 0 a 1 b 2 c and 2 a 1 b 0 c . The issue is whether a has card 0. The issue relation ≈ 0a distinguishes the two deals wherein a has card 0, i.e., 0 a 2 b 1 c and 0 a 1 b 2 c , from the two deals wherein a has card 2, i.e., 2 a 0 b 1 c and 2 a 1 b 0 c . And indeed, b's answer 'I don't know' corresponds to the ∼ b class consisting of 0 a 1 b 2 c and 2 a 1 b 0 c that properly intersects with the issue relation.
Game
If we want to play a game with questions and answers, to start with, it should be clear what we are playing for. What are the goals of the players? In the case of me asking for the right way to the railway station, my goal is knowledge about p: K a p ∨ K a ¬p. But in this case it is not so clear who I am playing against. Clearly not against the stranger I am addressing with this question. He has no interest. He answers the question, but he does not play a game. This is different in case you and I are both spies going after some government secrets. The secret is the truth about p and q. In fact, I already know the truth about p and you already know the truth about q. Your goal is to get to know p before I get to know q, and my goal is to get to know q before you get to know p. I.e., each agent has a goal. The goals can be described by goal formulae
In other words, I don't care if you know it, as long as I already know the other, and vice versa. The result of questions and answers is an information state wherein we can check for each player whether his goals are fullfilled. That determines a binary payoff function, and thus the outcome of the game.
So in order to play a game with questions and answers the players need a goal, and that goal can be an epistemic formula. Why should a player answer a question if that means giving away information that may make him lose the game? He has no reason whatsoever. However, just like in real life, if you wish the other person to loosen his information strings, you may only expect that by giving away some information yourself as well. The proceduralized version of this expectation, that we will apply in this contribution, is a game where each player may choose between different questions to ask, but where the other player addressed by that question is obliged to answer.
The information content of questions is a standard topic in the analysis of games, such as Mastermind (Flood, 1985 (Flood, -1986 Kooi, 2005) . This content is measured employing methods from information theory, such as the notion of entropy. Such games do not necessarily involve strategic response to questions chosen by other agents, e.g., in Mastermind played by a single player ( (Kooi, 2005 ) also treats multi-agent versions of Mastermind). We aim to integrate such analyses in game theory. Relations between game theory and pragmatic phenomena like the information content of questions are also studied in (van Rooij, 2003) . Our approach does not employ information theoretical measures yet: the value of a question is determined by the properties of the (expected) information state resulting from the answer.
Simplifications
In the remaining discussion, we make some simplifications for concreteness.
(i) We disregard pragmatic constraints on questions. You may ask a question to which you already know the answer. In other words, the question ϕ? is not also an informative update / public announcement of
Note that incorporating such constraints is quite doable. It merely restricts the players' strategies.
(ii) Avoiding to answer the question is not modelled as a move in the game. However, it is not problematic, as that response can be modelled as the trivial announcement.
(iii) There are two players only, that ask each other questions. If there are more than two players, one has to specify who is addressed by the question. Again, this is doable, and an answer to the question would still be a public announcement.
(iv) The most natural interaction between players involving questions and answers is where they ask each other questions in turn, such that a question is answered before the next question is asked. Extensive game forms for imperfect information games, with sequential equilibria, are harder to analyze than one-shot games in strategic form (Harsanyi, 1967 (Harsanyi, -1968 . For now, we assume that the two players ask each other a single question, and that they ask the question at the same time; say, by writing down the question on a piece of paper, putting it in an envelope, and then exchanging envelopes. For the answer, they again exchange envelopes.
Knowledge games
Consider a game where a strategy does not consist of choosing which question to ask to another player but choosing which announcement to make yourself. The different questions for me to ask are exactly the different announcements for the respondent to make. For example, let ϕ and ψ both be true, and you know that, but I don't know that and I consider it possible that you know, so that I have an incentive to ask. Instead of a game wherein I have to choose between asking you ϕ? or asking you ψ?, we can consider a game wherein you have to choose between announcing ϕ! or announcing ψ!. The analysis must be similar. Such games have been coined public announcement games in (Ågotnes et al., 2011) . (Appendix 8.4 gives formal details of public announcement games.) Our work merges their approach with the analysis of question dynamics in (van Benthem et al., 2009) . Somewhat similarly to public announcement games, the knowledge games in (van Ditmarsch, 2002; van Ditmarsch, 2004) treat the more general case where the question is public but the answer may be semi-public: the other players know what the question is, but may only partially observe the answer. E.g., the question may be to show a card only to the requesting player but there is common knowledge of some card being shown; the alternatives are the different cards to be shown; (van Ditmarsch, 2004 ) contains summary game theoretical results.
Contributions of this paper
Summarizing, the motivation for our research is to model conversation including the dynamics of questions and answers, to provide new links between game theory and dynamic logics of information, and to exploit the dynamic/strategic structure that, we think, lies implicitly inside epistemic models for epistemic languages, and to make that structure an explicit subject of logical study. The novel contributions that we present in this paper are the notion of a two-person question-answer game with information goals, the existence and computation of equilibria for these games, the correspondence with Bayesian games and their equilibria, and connections between logic and game theory such as the existence of equilibria (subject to restrictive conditions) for positive goal formulae. A technical appendix defines the logical and game theoretical terminology used in the continuation.
Pointed and induced question-answer games
The questions that the players may ask depend on what they initially know, and the value of these questions depends on what they learn from the answers, i.e., on what they know after the answers have been given: are the goals now satisfied or not? Questions, knowledge before and after, and goals: these are all formulae. This is a syntactic description of the game. Alternatively, there is a semantic description of the game. Initial knowledge is encoded in a relational model (a Kripke structure), questions and their answers induce model restrictions, final knowledge is encoded in that restriction, and the value of goals depends on whether the goal formulas are false or true in that final model. We will continuously shift perspective between the syntax and the semantics. That is the advantage of a logical modelling. The semantic view is more suitable for computational results, such as counting strategies and determining payoffs-in this we are also assisted by the epistemic model checker DEMO, treated in a separate Section 6.
Given two agents a and b, an epistemic model M = (S, ∼ a , ∼ b , V ) encodes their uncertainty about facts and about each other; two formulas γ a and γ b in the logical language express what they wish to achieve by their questions. In order to achieve their goals, agent a asks a question ϕ? to agent b, to which b is obliged to respond with 'yes' (I know that ϕ), 'no' (I know that ¬ϕ), or 'don't know' (I don't know whether ϕ). Of course, it might just as well have been b asking a question to a, so we may refer to the two agents as i and j, where i = j, and i may be either a or b. We assume both agents ask their question simulaneously, and that subsequently both agents answer the question simultaneously. The question formulas can be thought of as defining the strategies for the agents. (See Appendix 8.1 for the syntax and semantics of public announcement logic.) DEFINITION 3 (STRATEGY). -A strategy for a player is a question ϕ?, where ϕ is a formula in the language of public announcement logic L. Both players have the same set of strategies.
Executing the strategy ϕ for agent i can be thought of as follows. Agent i asks ϕ? to j. If M, s |= K j ϕ, then j answers (announces) "Yes, I know that ϕ". If M, s |= K j ¬ϕ, then j answers "No, I know that ¬ϕ". Otherwise, j answers "I don't know whether ϕ". The resulting model restriction depends on both answers, e.g., if a asks ϕ? to which b responds K b ϕ! and b asks ψ? to which a responds K a ¬ψ!, the result is the restricted model M |(K b ϕ ∧ K a ¬ψ). We can capture these alternatives with a construct K i ϕ, for 'agent i answers the question ϕ?', defined as follows. Given an epistemic model M and a state
. This is reminiscent of the resolution on ϕ in (van Benthem et al., 2009 ).
Alternatively, we can represent the question by an issue relation ≈ ϕ and the public announcement of answering the question in the link-cutting way of (van Benthem et al., 2007; van Benthem et al., 2009 ). As we combine a question and the answer to it into a single strategy in this simplified question-answer game, we do not need this more detailed formalization.
A player's strategic choice depends on what he knows, i.e., on the states he considers possible: he cannot make different choices in indistinghuishable states; his strategies are uniform strategies. But whether the goal formula is realized, the payoff, depends on the actual state only. This is a standard strategic game of imperfect information. The question-answer game defined below is that game. It is convenient for the computation of the equilibria of that game, and to keep the presentation simple, to define the question-answer game in terms of the pointed question-answer game, also defined below. The actual state, and therefore the pointed question-answer game, determines the payoff. But a player may not know what the actual state is, and therefore not know which game he is playing. Therefore, the not-pointed version is the obvious strategic game.
Except for the more complex payoff function of the pointed game, these definitions are adaptations of similar concepts in (Ågotnes et al., 2011) . Nevertheless, the question-answer games we get are fundamentally different from the public announcement games of (Ågotnes et al., 2011) . See Appendix 8.4 for a definition of public announcement games, and Section 3.1 and Section 5.1 on differences between the two games.
DEFINITION 4 (POINTED QUESTION-ANSWER GAME). -The state game or pointed question-answer game G((M, s), γ a , γ b ) associated with state s ∈ M and goals γ a and γ b for agents a and b respectively, is the strategic game defined by
Note that the set of strategies A i is the same in all states.
As a state independent perspective on question-answer games we propose the following definition. It can be easily shown that this corresponds to a Bayesian game (Harsanyi, 1967 (Harsanyi, -1968 , in the sense that it has the same Nash equilibria; we will address that in Section 4. In Definition 5, a strategy a i for player i is uniform iff for all s, t ∈ S: s ∼ i t implies a i (s) = a i (t).
DEFINITION 5 (QUESTION-ANSWER GAME).
Given state games
The uniform strategies from states to questions are called conditional strategies.
As there are (countably) infinitely many formulas in the language, there are infinitely many strategies in a pointed question-answer game, and therefore also infinitely many conditional strategies in an induced question-answer game. However, by shifting from a syntactic to a semantic point of view, we can achieve a major simplification. DEFINITION 6 (STRATEGY EQUIVALENCE). -Let a model M be given. Two strategies ϕ? and ψ? for a question-answer game for M are the same (equivalent) for
Note that it is common knowledge to a and b if two strategies are the same, as we are comparing the denotations of formulas involving ϕ and ψ in the model, independent of the actual state. 
There are other examples, such that the denotation of 'j knows ϕ' is the same as that of 'j does not know whether ψ', and so on.
In practice we will use just any questions (strategies) that have our fancy and that are equivalent to K j ϕ, i.e., if a knows that either K b p or K b ¬p, then she considers strategy (question) p?. Given the model in question, this particular strategy may be the same as, say, ((q ∧ ¬K a r) ∨ K b (p ∧ q))?-but we don't care. DEFINITION 8 (SIMPLE STRATEGY). -Given an epistemic model M , a simple strategy for an agent i is an i-equivalence class of questions (subject to the equivalence in Definition 6).
Unless confusion results, from now on all strategies are simple strategies, and all conditional strategies are simple conditional strategies.
As a strategy in the induced game is uniform, instead of seeing it as a function from states to formulas, we can also see such a strategy for agent i as a function from i-equivalence classes to formulas, and therefore, to make life simpler, as a function from formulas characterizing i-equivalence classes to formulas. In other words, we can see them as conditional strategies indeed: "if you know p, ask q?, or else ask r?," etc. That seems a fairly natural but still utterly precise way to specify strategies. We have shifted our perspective again between the syntax and the semantics. No matter how we view our strategies, executing the strategy still means asking the question ϕ?.
With these simplifications there are fewer strategies: if our models are finite, there are only a finite number of non-equivalent strategies. The next subsection contains an example wherein both players only have two 'real' (i.e., non-equivalent) strategies. Subject to the identification of strategies with the same tri-partition, the number of strategies for i is a function of the number of the equivalence classes for agent j in the model M . We do not have that function, and probably it is not very elegant, because for the 'I don't know' alternative to be non-empty a class needs to contain at least two states. This is more a combinatorial than a logical requirement, and therefore we leave it aside for now. For the special case where the 'don't know' alternative is always empty, the count is easy. Let us look at that.
If the strategies for i have the form K j ϕ?, there are only two and not three answers, namely only 'yes' and 'no'. If strategies are required to have this form for both agents, we call this a dichotomous question-answer game. The number of simple and conditional strategies is now even lower.
PROPOSITION 9 (NUMBER OF CONDITIONAL STRATEGIES). -Given an epistemic model M that is a bisimulation contraction and that is connected. Let player i have m i equivalence classes and let player j have m j equivalence classes. Then, in a dichotomous question-answer game, there are 2 mj mi−mi (non-equivalent) conditional strategies for player i and there are 2 mimj −mj (non-equivalent) conditional strategies for player j.
PROOF. -In a bisimulation contracted model, different equivalence classes for an agent can be distinguished from one another in the logical language. A connected model is a model such that between any two states s and t in the domain there exists a path consisting of ∼ a and ∼ b links. Let us consider for a moment that there were a disconnected part of the model, and consider two questions to which the possible answers would only be different in that disconnected part. In other words, it would be common knowledge to a and b that they would know the same after any answer to either question. As the difference between these questions would not show in their knowledge, there is no strategic difference.
Assume that player i has m i equivalence classes and player j has m j equivalence classes. Then player i has 2 mj mi−mi pure strategies. This we can see as follows. There are 2 mj −1 different dichotomies for player j (i.e. coarsenings of player j's partition), and for each of m i different equivalence classes for the requesting player i, she may choose one of those questions, therefore the total number of pure strategies is (2 mj −1 ) mi = 2 mj mi−mi . This number is exact, because all dichotomies for each player can be distinguished from one another, and that is because all equivalence classes for each player can be distinguished from one another.
We now illustrate all these matters by an extended example.
Example
Consider a three-state model where a knows the truth about p and b knows the truth about q. (For the state where p is true and q is false we write pq, etc.)
If p and q are both true, player a is uncertain about q, and b is uncertain about p, if p is true and q is false, b knows that q is false, but a is uncertain about q; etc. Given state qp, player a has two strategies, namely asking for the truth about q, the strategy q?, or asking the trivial question, ?. Only, a does not know that this is the actual state! For the induced game, a has four strategies, namely, in words: 'If I know p then I ask q?, otherwise I ask q?', 'If I know p then I ask q?, otherwise I ask ?', 'If I know p then I ask ?, otherwise I ask q?', 'If I know p then I ask ?, otherwise I ask ?'. The figure below contains the combined game trees of the three pointed question-answer games for this model, for the goal formulas K b p → K a q for a, and K a ¬q for b. The dotted lines connect states to the strategic game forms for the three state games (see below). The dashed lines connect states to the model restriction resulting from the answers to the questions labeling the lines. In the figure above, the strategic game form for the game with point qp is ? p? ? 00 00 q? 01 01
Let us see what this means. If a and b both ask ?, there is no model restriction. In the initial model, in state qp, the goal formulas K b p → K a q for a, and K a ¬q for b are both false. Therefore, the outcome in that entry is (0, 0), i.e., 00. If a asks q? and b asks p?, in the resulting singleton state qp player a has not realized her goal, because K b p → K a q is false (as K b p is true whereas K a q is false, but player b has realized his goal, as K a ¬q is true. The entry therefore is 01. Note that in this example the goal for b is that agent a knows something. Of course b may not know if a knows that. We simply assume an 'oracle' to inform the players of their payoffs. The Nash equilibria in the game matrix are underlined. So far, the pointed game. Now, for the induced game.
As a strategy is a function from states to questions, we can represent it by a set of (state, question) pairs. For example, the second of agent a's induced strategies mentioned above 'If I know p then I ask q?, otherwise I ask ?' corresponds to {(qp, q?), (qp, q?), (qp, ?)} With this identification in mind, the four ('conditional') strategies for a and the four strategies for b in the induced game are as follows: We now display these results in the (4 × 4) strategic game form for the induced game. Again, the Nash equilibria are underlined. E.g., in the induced game (a 3 a , a 3 b ) is a Nash equilibrium wherein both players always ask the real and not the trivial question. Note that it is weakly dominant for a to ask q? to b, i.e., to ask the real and not the trivial question. 
as in the introduction, we get another strategic game form for the induced game. It is as follows. There are also examples without a Nash equilibrium. Note that in this simple example, we cannot get three answers (yes/no/don't know) to a question: that requires at least three equivalence classes for the responding agent. (In the introductory cards example agent b had three equivalence classes.)
Public announcement games and question-answer games
As mentioned, question-answer games are induced from Kripke structures and goals in the same way as public announcement games (Ågotnes et al., 2011) . However, there is no obvious relationship between question-answer games and public announcement games induced from the same structure and the same goals. For example, the public announcement game induced from the example above gives a very different matrix for the same goal formulae This is not identical to the previous matrix, it is not a mirror-image, unlike the previous one all rows have different entries, etc.
Both players still have four strategies in this question-answer game and the public announcement game with the same goals. But in general the players need not have the same number of strategies. For example, let a have two equivalence classes, and b three, then in the question-answer game a has (2 3−1 ) 2 = 16 strategies and agent b has (2 2−1 ) 3 = 8 conditional strategies, whereas for the public announcement game these figures are 4 and 32. It is therefore unclear if there is a structural relation between game matrices for question-answer games and public announcement games, even given the same initial uncertainty and the same goals for the players!
Bayesian games
The induced question-answer game can be modelled as a Bayesian game. This can be shown in exactly the same way as the corresponding result for public announcement games in (Ågotnes et al., 2011) . We give an overview of the argument here. See Appendix 8.3 for the definition of a Bayesian game.
A signal t i for player i corresponds to an i-equivalence class. In a Bayesian game, the combination of a player i and a signal t i defines a virtual player (i, t i ), who has the same strategies a i ∈ A i at his disposition. This amounts to the same as our definition involving the same players i employing uniform (across equivalence classes!) strategies a i that are conditional strategies from states to simple strategies a i ∈ A i , and therefore can be seen as conditional from equivalence classes to strategies a i .
In our modelling, all states s in a given Kripke model get equal a priori probability of P r(s) = 1 |S| , i.e., uniform over the entire domain. (And this is their probability for all agents.) A more general approach would have a given probability distribution as a parameter in the modelling of the game. However, a uniform distribution is a reasonable assumption from the perspective of the observer or modeller of such a multi-agent system: given common knowledge of the structure of the model, as usual in multi-S5 conditions, there is no reason to prefer one state over another one. For example, if the Kripke model represents uncertainty about card deals, and the cards are shuffled and drawn blindly from the pack by the players, there is no reason to consider any given card deal (possible world / state) more likely than any other card deal.
In the Bayesian modelling, after receiving their signal, each agent conditionalizes the probability mass over its equivalence class. We then have that P r(s|t i ) = 1 |ti| in case t i = [s] ∼i , and P r(s|t i ) = 0, else. For each state inside the class the probability is non-zero and uniform in that class, and for each state t outside that class the probability is 0. The zero-probability outside the equivalence class entails that the agent does not consider any state possible outside the class.
In question-answer games the payoff for agent i is computed as
whereas for the corresponding Bayesian game one would get a sum (see (Ågotnes et al., 2011) )
These sums may be different, because in the former we divide by |S| whereas in the latter we divide by |[s] ∼i | (and any two equivalence classes may have a different size). However, they induce the same order on payoffs and thus they determine corresponding Nash equilibria. This justifies the following proposition. It can be proved as (Ågotnes et al., 2011, Th.24 ).
PROPOSITION 10.
-Given an epistemic model and goals for both players, the equilibria of the question-answer game correspond to the equilibria of the associated Bayesian game.
Positive goals and most informative answers
Consider the fragment of the positive formulae of L:
where p ∈ Θ. This notion of positive formulae is found in (van Ditmarsch et al., 2006) . It is an extension of (van Benthem, 2006) who observed that purely epistemic (without announcement operators) positive formulae are preserved under submodels.
PROPOSITION 11. -If both players' goals are positive formulae, each pointed question-answer game has a Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium is explicitly definable.
PROOF 12. -Let s be the actual state of the Kripke model M for which we play the game. If player i asks a question to player j that makes j reveal all he knows (i.e., such that the denotation of the answer is the ∼ j -equivalence class containing the actual state), either i's goal is now realized, or there is no way she can realize that goal. This is because if there were a weaker announcement by j also realizing that goal, a further model restriction would preserve the goal, as it is positive. Therefore, asking the question that elicits the most informative answer is a weakly dominant strategy for i, for the pointed question-answer game for state s. And as this holds for both players, that must be a Nash equilibrium of the pointed question-answer game for state s. As s was arbitrary, this holds for all pointed games.
We observe that in a finite model we can simply compute the question that elicits the most informative answer. In other words, the equilibrium is definable.
Unfortunately, the players may not know what question elicits the most informative answer, as they may be unable to distinguish the actual state from another state in which the same question does not elicit the most informative answer. This is related to the well-known distinction between de dicto knowledge and de re knowledge (van Benthem, 2001; Jamroga et al., 2004) . We can call a strategy for a given agent weakly dominant de re, if the agent knows that it is weakly dominant (i.e., if in all states indistinguishable for that agent, including the current state, that strategy is weakly dominant). The agent has a weakly dominant strategy de dicto if he has a weakly dominant strategy in all indistinguishable states-but now it may be a different one in each, so he cannot choose which one to execute. Similarly, we can distinguish a de dicto Nash equilibrium from a de re Nash equilibrium, wherein all players know what their equilibrium profiles are. Obviously, all equilibria of the induced questionanswer game are de re equilibria, as the strategies are uniform. It then means that each player has a uniform strategy that is weakly dominant.
Public announcement games and question-answer games
This brings us to another difference between public announcement games and question-answer games, apart from the points mentioned in Section 3.1. From a player's perspective, there is such a thing as a most informative announcement (tell them all you know). If all goals are positive, then the most informative announcement is a weakly dominant strategy in all points of the public announcement game. And because players know what their most informative announcement is, this is therefore an equilibrium strategy of the induced public announcement game.
But the question that elicits the most informative answer from another player cannot be called the most informative question from the questioning player's point of view. In a different state in the same equivalence class for that player, the question to elicit the most informative answer may be a different question, as the responding player may be in a different equivalence class there. So even when all goals are positive, induced question-answer games may not have an equilibrium.
Model checking question-answer games in DEMO
The question answer games can be implemented in the functional programming language Haskell, by the intermediary of the dynamic epistemic model checker DEMO developed by van Eijck (van Eijck, 2007) , that is written in Haskell. This model checker is a very useful tool for our investigations, as they are both logical and combinatorial. We will summarily illustrate this by showing how the example in Section 3 is modelled in DEMO with various Haskell program extensions that allow us to compute the game matrix of the induced question answer game.
The three state model
is represented in DEMO in a compact way using lists, as follows.
The first list is the domain of the model, then we have a compact representation for the valuation function for each of the worlds by a list of atomic propositions true at that world. Next we have a representation of the agents' (players') knowledge using a list describing the information partitions induced by their indistinguishability relations, first for a, and then for b. Another element in modelling question-answer games are the dynamic epistemic actions changing epistemic structures. In our case we only need to model public announcements. A public announcement ϕ! transforms an epistemic model into a new one updated with the formula ϕ. It has the following type: upd_pa :: Ord state => EpistM state -> Form -> EpistM state For instance, the result of updating the epistemic model considered in Section 3 with the formula K a p is as follows:
Finally, the truth-value of formulas can be computed at a state in an epistemic model, for example:
says that in the model obtained from the model in Section 3 by announcing K a p, at the world with index 1, the formula K b q does not hold.
Our implementation builds on the functionality presented so far to compute the outcome of question-answer games. We will refrain from presenting the reader with details and simply observe that we can do the computation all the way up to getting the payoff matrix for the induced game.
*QPAG> display 4 (qagn (named m79) (imp (K b p) (K a q),K a (Neg q))) (2,0)(1,0)(2,0)(1,0) (2,0)(1,0)(2,0)(1,0) (2,1)(2,1)(2,1)(2,1) (2,1)(2,1)(2,1)(2,1)
we get the following payoff matrix, indeed.
) (2,2)(1,3)(2,2)(1,3) (2,2)(1,3)(2,2)(1,3) (3,1)(3,3)(3,1)(3,3) (3,1)(3,3)(3,1)(3,3)
Our implementation is not just for this initial distribution of uncertainty, and the particular goals chosen, but for any finite two-agent epistemic model and pair of goals for a and b. It is therefore useful to investigate systematically properties of question-answer games.
Further research
We have proposed looking at concrete question-answer games in epistemic settings. Compared to the existing literature, this seems a natural specialization, which reveals a lot of interesting new topics with sometimes new twists to existing systems. Here are a few:
Logical issues
We can add interactive game structure to existing systems of knowledge and question dynamics. What are best languages and logics for explicitly describing the resulting interactive 'power structure' of agents in epistemic scenarios? Can we specialize further existing notions from these areas to our games, as a test ground for their viability?
Game-theoretic issues
In our concrete games, new connections arise between logic and game theory, such as connections between Nash equilibria and the syntax of goal statements for players. Clearly, this is just the start of a whole new line of investigation. Also, existing 'game logics' tend to be about abstract games. As so often in dynamic epistemic logics, question answer games might be a good testing ground for checking whether the general notions proposed in game logics make sense.
Descriptive issues
Our games use questions only in a minimal sense, tied immediately to answers. How to introduce and exploit richer question views, as available in the existing literature on the dynamic epistemic logic of questions, interrogative logic, and inquisitive semantics? As mentioned, a pragmatic constraint on questions is that the interrogator does not know the answer, but expects the addressee to know the answer.
Perhaps most urgently, real games of inquiry are sequential, involving stepwise interaction: so how to extend our one-step question-answer games to extensive games with non-simultaneous moves?
Strategic Game
A strategic game is a triple G = N, {A i : i ∈ N }, {u i : i ∈ N } where: N = {1, . . . , n} is the finite set of players; for each i ∈ N , A i is the set of strategies (or actions) available to i. A = × j∈N A j is the set of strategy profiles; and for each i ∈ N , u i : A → R is the payoff function for i, mapping each strategy profile to a number. Notation (a 1 , . . . , a n )[a i /a i ] stands for the profile wherein strategy a i is replaced by a i . A strategy profile is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium if every strategy is the best response of that agent to the strategies of the other agents, i.e., if the agent can not do any better by choosing a different strategy given that the strategies of the other agents are fixed. Formally, a profile (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i ∈ N , for all a i = a i , u i ((a 1 , . . . , a n )[a i /a i ]) ≤ u i (a 1 , . . . , a n ). A strategy for an agent is weakly dominant if it is at least as good for that agent as any other strategy, no matter which strategies the other agents choose. Formally, a strategy a i for agent i is weakly dominant if and only if for all strategies a 1 , . . . , a n for players 1, . . . , n respectively, u i (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ≤ u i ((a 1 , . . . , a n )[a i /a i ]).
Bayesian game
The most common model of strategic games with imperfect information is the Bayesian game (Harsanyi, 1967 (Harsanyi, -1968 . Our presentation of Bayesian games is as in (Osborne et al., 1994) . A Bayesian strategic game BG = N, S, {A i | i ∈ N }, {T i | i ∈ N }, {P r i | i ∈ N }, {τ i | i ∈ N }, {u i | i ∈ N } has the following components: N is the set of players; S is the finite set of states s modelling the players' uncertainty about each other; and for each i ∈ N : A i is the set of strategies of player i; T i is the set of signals t i that may be observed by player i, τ i : S → T i is the signal function of player i; P r i is a probability measure on S (the prior belief of player i) such that P r i (τ −1 (t i )) > 0 for all t i ∈ T i , i.e., each player's signal is correct with strictly positive probability; and finally u i is a payoff function on the set of probability measures over A × S (instead of a payoff function on the set of action profiles a).
To compute Nash equilibria of a Bayesian game, an intermediary set of players (i, t i ), for every player i ∈ N and signal t i ∈ T i for that player, is employed. A Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game is defined as a Nash equilibrium of the following strategic game: -N = {(i, t i ) | i ∈ N, t i ∈ T i }; -A (i,ti) = A i ; -u (i,ti) (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = s∈S P r(s | t i )u i (a 1 , . . . , a n , s).
Public Announcement Game
The following definitions are adapted from (Ågotnes et al., 2011) in order to make their similarity striking to primitives for question-answer games. DEFINITION 13 (STRATEGY). -A strategy for a player is an announcement ϕ!, where ϕ is a formula in the language of public announcement logic L. Both players have the same set of strategies.
Given an epistemic model M and a state s ∈ M , and a player i, executing strategy ϕ! means that i announces the truth about his knowledge of ϕ: i announces K i ϕ! if M, s |= K i ϕ (i.e., i truthfully announces ϕ!), and that i announces ¬K i ϕ!, else. Note that Definition 15 and Definition 5 (of Question-Answer Game, on page 9) are nearly identical. The only difference is that in the former the input is a set of |S| pointed public announcement games, whereas in the latter the input is a set of |S| pointed question-answer games.
